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1. Remaining problems in the study of fallacies
Since Hamblin’s (1970) devastating portrayal of the state of the art in the study of
fallacies in the 1960s, several new theoretical approaches have been developed in which the
fallacies are viewed as “wrong moves in argumentative discourse” rather than as “arguments
that seem valid but are in fact not” (van Eemeren, 2001).1 Although, in general, nowadays
Hamblin’s criticisms no longer apply, a fully satisfactory theory of the fallacies is in our view
still lacking. For one thing, the intriguing problem of the remarkable persuasiveness of (a
great many of) the fallacies, which in the traditional standard definition of a fallacy was
referred to by the word “seem,” has not been addressed.2 More importantly, a systematic
treatment is still lacking of the criteria needed to pin down manifestations of the various types
of fallacies in everyday argumentative discourse. In this paper, we shall argue that a better
idea can be gained of how a great many of the fallacies “work” by incorporating rhetorical
considerations into a dialectical approach of the fallacies. This theoretical renewal will lead to
a fuller understanding of the demarcation between argumentative moves that are sound and
fallacious argumentative acting.

2. Ad hoc treatments and systematic treatments of the fallacies
A great many fallacy theorists tend to take the traditional list of fallacies as it is
handed down by history and established in the literature as their point of departure. A major
disadvantage of such a treatment of the fallacies is that it is in fact ad hoc.3 In spite of
Woods’ (1992) protestations, rather than a systematic and theoretically motivated catalogue
of the fallacies, the traditional list is a more or less arbitrary collection of the diverse kinds of
argumentative moves that have earlier been recognized as fallacious.
A fundamental problem of giving each fallacy its own treatment is that not only the
treatments may be at variance with each other,4 but also the theoretical perspectives from
which the treatments start. In our view, it is a crucial requirement of any theoretically
adequate evaluation of argumentative discourse, whether it is given in terms of fallacies or
not, that the norms that are applied in the evaluation have a common rationale that guarantees
their pertinence and coherence. This rationale and the norms used in its implementation
should reflect a clearly defined philosophical ideal of reasonableness and rationality.5
Another crucial requirement is that the norms that are used in the evaluation of
argumentative discourse can be made instrumental by relying on specific and applicable
criteria that make it possible to decide in specific instances of argumentative discourse
whether a certain norm has been violated or not. Otherwise the outcomes of the evaluative
judgments cannot be properly justified.6
In more systematic treatments of the fallacies, such as Hamblin’s (1970) and Barth
and Krabbe’s ‘formal dialectics’ (1982),7 and van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s ‘pragma1
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dialectics’ (1984, 1992a, 2003),8 the requirements we just mentioned are, at least partly, taken
into account. Instead of taking the traditional list of fallacies as their point of departure, these
dialectical fallacy theorists start from a general critical rationalist perspective on
argumentative discourse as a dialectical exchange of moves aimed at testing the acceptability
of standpoints that serves as their rationale for designing particular theoretical systems or
models of a sound critical discussion. Fallacies are then conceived as argumentative moves
excluded by the rules of a particular dialectical system or as moves that violate the rules of
the procedural model for conducting a critical discussion. In both cases, the reasons for
finding fault with such moves are independent of the traditional listing of the fallacies and
these reasons are closely related with the general goal that is attributed to the discourse.9 In
pragma-dialectics, this general goal is resolving a difference of opinion by testing the
acceptability of the standpoints at issue.10
Although the systematic requirement has thus been fulfilled that the norms for
evaluating argumentative discourse have a common rationale that guarantees their pertinence
and coherence, in pragma-dialectics and other dialectical approaches some other desiderata
have not yet been fulfilled: (1) adequate criteria for deciding in concrete cases univocally
whether or not a certain rule has been violated are still lacking; (2) no explanation has been
given for why a lot of fallacies can be so persuasive; (3) no clues have been given as to why
fallacies do so easily go unnoticed.
An important reason why dialecticians have been so slow in developing the criteria
that are needed to be able to check whether the rules are correctly applied in practice, is that
so far they have almost exclusively concentrated on the critical objectives presupposed in
their rules, without being interested in other kinds of purposes of the arguers. Paying attention
to the reasons a party may have in ordinary discourse for not complying with the rules
because of the pursuit of other purposes, which may be at odds with the aims of a critical
discussion, may lead to an explanation of why a violation of a rule for critical discussion is
sometimes inevitable. It is therefore imperative to know in each stage of a critical discussion
what the other relevant purposes can be.
Deviations from the rules of critical discussion are often at the same time persuasive
as well as hard to detect because normally the parties involved are very keen on maintaining
the pretence of reasonableness and portraying themselves as living up to critical standards. It
can therefore be expected that, in order to realize a purpose that is potentially at odds with the
objective of a critical discussion rule, they will stick as much as possible to the means
available for achieving the relevant critical objective and attempt to “stretch” the use of these
means in such a way that the other purpose can be realized as well. This predicament makes it
necessary for the analyst to know in advance as much as possible about the ways in which the
means that can be used to achieve the specific objective of a certain stage in a critical
discussion can be employed parasitically to realize purposes that may be at odds with this
objective. Except for Walton (1992) and Walton and Krabbe (1995), the dialectical theorists
have ignored the issue of multi-purposes and cross-purposes in real-life argumentative
discourse.11

3. Including the rhetorical dimension in a dialectical treatment of the fallacies
In several recent papers about our pragma-dialectical approach to the fallacies we
have taken due account of the persuasive aims of the arguers engaged in argumentative
discourse (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2002a, 2002b). In this endeavor, we started from the
assumption that persuasive aims need not necessarily be realized at the expense of achieving
critical objectives. The arguers’ attempts to have things their way can very well be
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incorporated in their efforts to resolve a difference of opinion in accordance with the
standards for critical discussion: while the arguers can be presumed to maintain these critical
standards, they can, in our view, at the same time be presumed to be out for an optimal
persuasive result. In their efforts to achieve this result, they may resort to what we have
termed strategic maneuvering directed at simultaneously achieving critical and persuasive
aims by diminishing the potential tension between them.
Of course, our view of strategic maneuvering, which is basically aimed at reconciling
dialectical and rhetorical objectives, does by no means mean that we think that the two different
objectives will in the end always be in perfect balance. On the one hand, arguers may neglect
their persuasive interests for fear of being perceived as unreasonable; on the other hand, in their
assiduity to win the other party over to their side, they may neglect their commitment to the
critical ideal. If parties allow their commitment to a critical exchange of argumentative moves to
be overruled by their aim of persuading the opponent, their strategic maneuvering violates a
particular discussion rule and has got “derailed.” Because this kind of maneuvering may
victimize the other party, we are entitled to consider it fallacious.
Not in all cases the demarcation line between sound and fallacious strategic
maneuvering is immediately clear. We have just given an account that explains why fallacies
are usually not immediately apparent to everyone. In everyday argumentative discourse,
arguers who maneuver strategically will normally uphold a commitment to the standards of
critical reasonableness and their interlocutors will expect them to live up to such a
commitment. Thus, an assumption of reasonableness is conferred on every discussion move
(see also Jackson, 1995). Even when a particular way of maneuvering is fallacious because it
violates a certain discussion rule, unless there are clear indications to the contrary, this
assumption of reasonableness is still operative. Echoing the “standard” definition of a fallacy,
we can then say that the maneuvering pretends to comply with the rules of critical discussion,
but in fact does not.

4. Fallacies and derailments of strategic maneuvering
Instead of beginning and ending with the traditional or any other list of fallacies, our
approach takes as its starting point of analysis the various types of strategic maneuvering. An
important advantage of this starting point is that it makes it possible to clarify the relationship
between the fallacies and their “sound counterparts,” and to explain the potentially persuasive
character of the fallacies and the fact that they often go unnoticed.12 We shall now focus on
the ways in which our approach can be of help in developing criteria for identifying instances
of fallacious argumentative acting.
In our view, each type of strategic maneuvering has, in a manner of speaking, its own
“continuum” of sound and fallacious acting. Although fallacy judgments are in the end
always contextually determined judgments regarding specific instances of situated
argumentative acting, this does not mean that no clear criteria can be established in advance
to determine whether a particular way of strategic maneuvering goes astray. Particular types
or categories of strategic maneuvering can be identified. For each of these types, specific
conditions can be determined that must be fulfilled if the maneuvering is to be sound. Certain
manifestations of strategic maneuvering can then be recognized as legitimate while other
manifestations can be pinned down as fallacious because the relevant conditions have not
been met.
The criteria for determining fallacies can only be fully developed in a systematic way
if first a well-considered classification is available of the diverse types of strategic
maneuvering and a specification is given of their soundness conditions. Such a classification
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of the types of strategic maneuvering should be based on a systematic specification of both
the critical aims and the persuasive aims that the parties may be supposed to attempt to
achieve at the various stages of an argumentative exchange. In our view, a good starting point
for specifying these aims is provided by the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion.
This model specifies the critical objectives of the parties in the four discussion stages. Each
of these critical objectives has, as we have argued earlier, its complementary ‘rhetorical’ aim:
in each discussion stage, the parties can attempt to achieve such complementary rhetorical
aims to realize their own persuasive intents and may thus arrive at making a move that
optimally furthers their own case. At all stages of the discussion, strategic maneuvering will
be aimed at doing so in such a way that the critical objective of the stage concerned is not
ignored – at least not openly. Therefore, the critical objectives of each particular discussion
stage determine what the strategic maneuvering may be aimed at.13 This fundamental insight
makes it possible to identify for each stage the potential discrepancy between the dialectical
and the rhetorical aims, the types of strategic maneuvering relevant for dissolving this
discrepancy, and the soundness conditions of each type of strategic maneuvering that can be
applied when accounting for the judgment that a certain type of strategic maneuvering has in
a particular case got derailed and a particular type of fallacy has been committed.

5. The tu quoque fallacy as a derailment of pointing out inconsistencies
As a case in point, we shall discuss the demarcation of non-fallacious and fallacious
instances of a specific type of strategic maneuvering that takes place in the opening stage of a
critical discussion. In this type of maneuvering a party attacks the other party by pointing out
a logical or pragmatic inconsistency between a starting point proposed by the other party and
a starting point this party assumed on a different occasion. Pointing out such an inconsistency
can be a perfectly sound – and even very strong – strategic maneuver, but it can also derail
and result in a tu quoque fallacy.
When we are talking about inconsistencies between starting points we may refer to
two kinds of starting points. First, in a proper critical discussion there are always (explicit or
implicit) procedural starting points. Second, there are also material starting points. Ideally,
both kinds of starting points should be fully clear. This means that the parties involved in the
dispute not only know how the discussion is going to be conducted but also what propositions
they can safely bring to bear once the discussion has come off the ground. Besides agreeing
on the discussion rules and the division of the burden of proof, the parties should in the
opening stage of the discussion also reach an agreement on the propositions that may be used
in the argumentation stage to defend and challenge the standpoints at issue.
In argumentative practice, there are certain institutional contexts, such as
parliamentary debates, in which an agreement on particular procedural starting points is
presupposed. It may be the case that even some material starting points are established
beforehand. According to Dutch law the latter applies, for instance, to admissions made by
the accused in the interrogation preceding the actual trial in a criminal case. Such admissions
can be used in court to establish conclusions weighing against or in favor of the accused, as
the case may be.
In non-institutionalized argumentative discourse there are usually no explicit
agreements as to the facts that are pertinent to the points at issue. It would in fact not only be
highly inefficient, but also superfluous, if each and every discussion had to begin by listing
all the relevant propositions on which the parties agree. Generally, the parties use certain
propositions as their starting points without asking for the other party’s consent, but taking
this consent, rightly or wrongly, for granted. All the same, there are a lot of cases in which it
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is first negotiated whether or not particular propositions may serve as a common starting
point. When such negotiations occur, they can be viewed as sub-discussions about the
acceptability of a sub-standpoint that has emerged in the opening stage of the main
discussion. Characteristic of such a sub-discussion is that – rather than leading to a
conclusion as to whether or not the sub-standpoint is acceptable in its own right – it results in
a conclusion as to whether or not the proposition can be used as a common starting point.
The dialectical profile of the initial exchange of moves in such negotiations is as
follows. The protagonist, aiming at securing a basis for his defense, initiates the negotiation
process by proposing to consider a specific proposition as a common starting point. He can,
for instance, claim that the proposition concerned is a good point of departure for the
discussion and invite the antagonist to accept it as a mutual starting point: “We simply have
to start somewhere. If you would agree with me on this, it is not so difficult to see what
should happen next.” Alternatively, he can attribute the proposition boldly to the antagonist,
as in “You do think that we need to get rid of this, don’t you?” followed by “Well, why don’t
we just give it away then?” He can also try to elicit this proposition as a ‘concession’ from
the antagonist. In all these cases, it is up to the antagonist to react. The antagonist may accept
the protagonist’s proposal, so that the negotiation comes to an end, but he can also reject the
proposal. In the latter case, the antagonist may make either of two moves. He can deny the
proposed proposition just like that the status of a common starting point: “I do not agree with
that.” He can also give reasons why the proposition should not be treated as a common
starting point: “You cannot just assume that. It is not at all clear what will happen.”14
Viewed dialectically, the antagonist is under no obligation to provide a reason for not
admitting a proposition as a common starting point (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2003,
Ch. 6). Viewed rhetorically, however, it may be better if he does. After all, it is generally
regarded of no use to start a discussion with people who refuse to commit themselves to any
common starting point or, without giving any further explanation, to a specific starting point.
Explaining why a certain proposition is denied the status of a common starting point can thus
be regarded as a germane form of strategic maneuvering. This type of maneuvering is aimed
at reconciling the rhetorical aim of admitting only starting points that are agreeable to the
antagonist’s own position and the dialectical objective of achieving sufficient common
ground for a critical discussion. By refusing to accept a particular proposition as a starting
point, the antagonist goes against the latter objective. He is therefore well advised to show
that the refusal is not gratuitous, so that it is at least clear that the higher order condition for
conducting a critical discussion has not been violated that participants should be prepared to
attempt to find some common ground.
Giving reasons for a refusal to admit a proposition as a common starting point can be
a perfectly sound way of strategic maneuvering, but it can also derail into a fallacy, e.g., the
fallacy of tu quoque. In the tu quoque case, the reason-giving amounts to saying that the
protagonist’s proposal to treat a proposition as a starting point is not acceptable because the
proposition is inconsistent with something the protagonist has said or implied (by what he
said or did) on a different occasion.15 If, for example, a protagonist proposes to start the
discussion from the assumption that all promises should be kept at all times, the antagonist
may point out that earlier on the protagonist advocated a less strict moral view or that he
never keeps his own promises.16 What soundness conditions make it possible to decide
whether or not an antagonist maneuvers in an admissible way when refusing to admit a
proposition as a starting point because of a proclaimed inconsistency between the proposed
proposition and the protagonist’s (verbal or non-verbal) behavior on a different occasion?
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6. Soundness conditions for pointing out inconsistencies in the opening stage
The soundness of the strategic maneuvering hinges on three points: a point of
definition, a matter of scope, and a quasi-empirical issue. The first point is one of a logicopragmatic nature: how is inconsistency to be defined so that it is possible to determine
whether two propositions are logically or pragmatically inconsistent? The second point is
how an accusation by the antagonist that pertains to an inconsistency between the proposition
that the protagonist presently proposes as a starting point and something the protagonist has
earlier done can be incorporated. The third point is to find out what in practice is to be
understood by “on a different occasion,” so that it can be determined in a specific case
whether viewed dialectically pointing at an inconsistency makes sense. We shall address
these three issues.
An adequate argumentation theory should make clear how the parties engaged in an
argumentative exchange can make use of logical and pragmatic insight to arrive at a common
understanding of (undesired) inconsistency. Because logical as well as pragmatic insight may
be derived from a variety of logical systems and theories of language use, it would be helpful
if a coherent choice could be made that is based on a well-considered and mutually agreed
upon philosophy of reasonableness and rationality. Such an opportunity is, for instance,
offered by the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation as it is externalized in the model
for conducting a critical discussion. If the parties engaged in a critical discussion have come
to an agreement about which logical and pragmatic views of inconsistency they will rely on, a
decision about whether or not two propositions are actually logically or pragmatically
inconsistent eventually depends on the result of the relevant ‘intersubjective inference
procedure’ they need to go through (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, Ch. 6).
Strictly speaking, the question of how a person who has performed a certain action
can be held committed to a certain proposition falls within the domain of action theory. The
current state of affairs in action theory is such, however, that no decisive criteria are available
for determining in all cases univocally whether or not a certain action implies a commitment
to a particular proposition (see, e.g., Walton, 1998: 31). In an earlier paper (van Eemeren and
Houtlosser, 2002b: 20) we have made a contribution to resolving this problem by making a
distinction between avowed commitments and contextual commitments. Avowed
commitments are propositional commitments that are explicitly assumed by the performance
of speech acts of the assertive type and they resemble the commitments that Walton and
Krabbe (1995) call “concessions.” Contextual commitments are, in our conception,
commitments that are assumed to be inherent in the discussion situation at hand. Obviously,
the propositional commitments that might be implied by the protagonist’s actions belong to
the latter category. Because contextual commitments are open to rejection and can eventually
only be of real consequence for the discussion if they stand up to an appropriate
intersubjective identification procedure, having performed a certain action can commit a
party to a certain proposition only if the parties engaged in the dialogue agree that the action
implies, or can be “translated in,” the proposition concerned. This may not seem to be very
helpful, but it should be borne in mind that in practical discussion situations all kinds of
agreements are presupposed that admit certain actions but prohibit others because they imply
a particular propositional commitment that is at odds with an “external” agreement. Examples
of such external agreements are legal (or semi-legal) contracts, legal (or semi-legal)
procedures, and even engaging in particular institutional or semi-institutional practices (see,
e.g., Walton, 1998: 285).17
The last issue we have left to address is what is to be understood by “on a different
occasion.” This issue seems empirical, but from a pragma-dialectical point of view it is not
entirely so. In pragma-dialectics, “on a different occasion” is defined as meaning “in a
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different critical discussion than the present one.” Therefore, from a pragma-dialectical point
of view, an inconsistency between something that is presently said and something that was
said on a different occasion matters only if it involves an inconsistency in one and the same
critical discussion. This point is particularly important when we are dealing with a
proclaimed inconsistency between a party’s starting points. The starting points that are
assumed in a critical discussion are assumed for the sake of having a constructive critical
discussion in a specific argumentative situation and this implies that the participants in such a
discussion cannot automatically be held committed to having accepted these starting points in
their own right and for their own sake. In a different critical discussion they are fully entitled
to assume starting points that are precisely the opposite. The only thing they are not allowed
to do is to accept and deny one and the same starting point in one and the same critical
discussion.
This insight may seem hard to apply to a practical argumentative situation. A critical
discussion in the pragma-dialectical sense is after all an idealization of a resolution-oriented
argumentative exchange and not a real-life discussion. It is, however, precisely this
discrepancy that makes it possible to resolve the problem of what is to be understood by “on
a different occasion” in a primarily theoretical way, instead of purely empirically. Because
real-life discussions never fully coincide with a critical discussion, an evaluation of a piece of
actual argumentative discourse with the help of the model of critical discussion always
requires a certain amount of methodical reconstruction which takes those and only those
(explicit and implicit) elements of the discourse into account that can have a function in the
process of resolving a difference of opinion. Such a reconstruction may assign contributions
to the resolution process to one and the same critical discussion that are in practice
temporally or locally distributed. If, for instance, a letter to the editor reacts to a newspaper
article that was published a week earlier, the article and the letter will be reconstructed as two
contributions to the same critical discussion. In some cases, pieces of argumentative
discourse can only be properly understood if they are first reconstructed as one critical
discussion. This implies that the answer to the question of what should count as “one and the
same critical discussion” ultimately depends on whether it is theoretically as well as
empirically justified to reconstruct particular pieces of argumentative discourse as being part
of one and the same critical discussion. How can it be determined if such a reconstruction is
justified?
We think that a reconstruction of two or more pieces of argumentative discourse as
being part of one and the same critical discussion is justified if the following conditions are
fulfilled:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

All pieces of argumentative discourse are aimed at resolving the same
difference of opinion;
All pieces of argumentative discourse have the same procedural starting
points;
All pieces of argumentative discourse (except for those that are at issue) have
the same material starting points;
The party whose proposal to use a certain proposition as a starting point was
rejected in a certain piece of argumentative discourse has assumed the same
position and the same discussion role in any of the preceding pieces of
discourse under consideration.

The first condition excludes cases in which the issues that are discussed in the various
pieces of argumentative discourse are not identical; the second condition excludes cases in
which the same issue is discussed but different discussion rules are followed; the third
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condition excludes cases in which there are also other starting points that differ than the
starting point that is at issue; the fourth condition excludes cases in which the protagonist of
the starting point at issue made this proposal while being in a different dialectical position or
having a different discussion role (e.g., as protagonist and defender of the opposite
standpoint).18 When taken together, these conditions guarantee that the proclaimed
inconsistency between a starting point that a protagonist presently proposes and a starting
point that this party proposed on a different occasion is an inconsistency in the opening stage
of one and the same critical discussion.
7. Conclusion
By developing a theoretical perspective on argumentative discourse that integrates
rhetorical insight in a pragma-dialectical framework, we have shown how a systematic and
general approach to the fallacies can be developed that explains their potential persuasiveness
as well as why they go often unnoticed. We have argued that the pragma-dialectical model of
a critical discussion can be a basis for designing a systematic classification of the various
types of strategic maneuvering that enables us to develop more adequate criteria for
distinguishing between sound and fallacious moves in argumentative discourse. As a case in
point, we have shown how the soundness conditions can be identified of strategic
maneuvering by means of pointing out inconsistencies in the other party’s verbal and nonverbal behavior in the opening stage of a critical discussion, so that occurrences of the fallacy
of tu quoque can be identified.

Notes
1

Among the protagonists of these new approaches are Hamblin (1970), Woods and Walton
(1989), Barth and Krabbe (1982), Finocchiaro (1981), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984,
1992a, 2003), Walton (1987, 1992, 1995), Johnson (2000), and Jacobs (2002).

2

Since Hamblin issued the verdict that this feature brings an undesirable element of
psychological subjectivity to the definition, fallacy theorists have not been concerned anymore
with the question of why fallacies can be effective (Jackson, 1995). Among critical theorists,
there was a broad consensus that it was desirable “to dispense with the use of vague and
subjective concepts like appearance and seemingly correct” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 87:
189). Whether an argument was correct of fallacious “surely must not be held to be question of
the honorable or deceitful intentions of the arguer. Here lies the route to an altogether
unwelcome “psychologism” (Woods and Walton, 1989: 64).
3

A different kind of disadvantage is that the use of the labels for the fallacies is in these
treatments often not restricted to cases that are considered unacceptable and unreasonable but
also includes acceptable and reasonable cases. An argumentum ad hominem can then be an
incorrect argumentative move but also a correct move. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(1992b) pointed out that it is confusing to maintain that “not all fallacies are fallacious” or
that “fallacies are not always fallacious.” We shall therefore reserve the names of the fallacies
for the fallacious cases, but we add immediately that the use of the same label for both
fallacious and non-fallacious moves may well be a sign that the authors who do so already
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have a hunch of the kind of relationship between non-fallacious and fallacious moves we are
about to discuss.
4

The older publications of Woods and Walton, and some of Walton’s later work, provide good
illustrations of how a label-oriented approach can easily lead to entirely different theoretical
treatments of each of the fallacies. See Woods and Walton (1989).
5

If abusive personal attacks, for instance, are judged fallacious in a theoretically interesting way,
reference should be made to a general idea of reasonableness that implies certain standards for
pursuing a particular goal with which abusive personal attacks are at odds.

6

These requirements suggest that a theory of fallacies can be lacking in various ways. It may,
for instance, provide a number of specific norms but no general rationale to back them up; but
also mention only exceptions to the norms instead of providing criteria for applying these norms.

7

See also Barth and Martens (1977).

8

If the fallacies are viewed from a more general philosophical perspective, some studies of
communicative acting by Habermas (1984) and Schreier et al. (e.g., 1995) can be added to this
list.
9

By relating their judgments concerning fallaciousness to an independent account of the sound
counterpart of fallacies, dialectical theories explain why a fallacious argument is fallacious. Why
exactly a sound argument that complies with the rules is sound, is to be explained independently.

10

It could just be a coincidence that a great many of the moves that, according to the theory are
condemnable – or non-moves – from the perspective of problem-solving capacity turn also out
to be fallacies in the traditional sense, but it is, of course, very likely that in developing the
traditional views the lack of problem-solving capacity of certain types of moves played a role.

11

Walton’s (1992) notion of a ‘dialectical shift,’ as developed further in Walton and Krabbe
(1995) comes, although it is conceptually not very clear, closest to a tool for taking such
complications into account.
12

As Hamblin (1970: 138-140, 158) informs us, scholars like Peter Ramus (Dialectique,
1555) and, in his wake, Fraunce (Lawiers Logike, 1588) still saw fallacies as the ‘captious’
counterparts of sound argument forms known as – dialectical and rhetorical – topics, while
scholars like Wallis (The Insitutio Logicae, 1688) and Aldrich (Artis Logicae Compendium,
1691) dropped the connection between fallacies and topics.
13

It stands to reason that to provide a more refined inventory of the types of strategic
maneuvering pertinent to the various stages, these stage-related ‘local’ aims need to be further
specified.
14

It may make a difference for the negotiations about the starting points which type of dispute
initiated the main discussion. When two consecutive attempts are made to resolve two nonmixed discussions ensuing from a mixed dispute, for instance, a particular proposition cannot be
at the same time accepted as a common starting point in the first discussion and not in the
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second discussion. In the case of a non-mixed discussion ensuing from a non-mixed dispute, no
such restrictions apply.
15

A rhetorical technique that comes close to this type of maneuvering is described in classical
rhetoric as the ab adversariorum-technique of anticategoria (‘counter charge,’ ‘accusing in
turn,’ Latin: accusatio adversa, translatio in adversarium, incidens quaestio, meaning ‘a retort
in which one turns the very accusation made by one’s adversary back against him’). Lausberg
(1998: section 197) describes the objective of anticategoria as compromising the prosecutor, in
this way proving his lack of jurisdiction. Anticategoria is divided into two genera. In reply to the
prosecutor’s accusation, the defendant charges the prosecutor with having committed (1) the
same particular crime, or (2) another crime; the other crime is in different ways related to the
crime of which the defendant is accused. In the second case, the relationship can be one of
similarity [with any other crime], one of causality [remotio, as in “Befehl ist Befehl”] or one
between the crime and the act of prosection itself [as in a dépit amoureux]. In today’s law courts,
the admissibility of this type of technique is not undisputed. In its decision of 3 February 1999,
the Trial Chamber [of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], for
instance, ruled that “the principle of tu quoque does not apply to international humanitarian law
since that body of law creates obligations erga omnes (contractantes) and not obligations based
on reciprocity.” The Chamber found, however, that “evidence of events beyond the main
geographical focus of the indictment may be admissible insofar as it is not repetitious and is duly
circumscribed and intended to rebut the allegations, explain the behaviour of the accused or
provide information concerning the organisation and activities of the armies involved.” The
Chamber added that “before adducing such evidence, the defence should state its purpose”
(http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/1999/index.htm).
16

In pragma-dialectics, tu quoque is primarily discussed as a violation of a rule for the
confrontation stage of a critical discussion, but in the pragma-dialectical conception of tu quoque
this fallacy can, unlike the other variants of the argumentum ad hominem, also be committed in
a later stage of the discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2003, Ch. 6). Then, the tu quoque is
not aimed at preventing the other party from maintaining a certain standpoint, but from founding
the case for a certain standpoint on a particular starting point.
17

Maxims such as “Practice what you preach” may, when turned around to mean that one
should not say things that are at odds with what one practices, even be regarded to point at the
existence of a general agreement that carrying out actions precludes having commitments that
are inconsistent with these actions.
18

In the classification of types of outcome of an argumentative dialogue proposed by Barth and
Martens (1977), our conditions apply to a thesis T being tenable ex consessis against opponent
O because it can be successfully defended against this opponent on the basis of a set of
concessions C. Barth and Martens also distinguish outcomes less dependent on the opponents
and their concessions: (1) a thesis tenable ex concessis (“follows logically from a set of
concessions C”) because it can be successfully defended against any opponent O on the basis of
a set of concessions C, and (2) a thesis tenable ( “logically true”) because it can be successfully
defended against any opponent O on the basis of any set of concessions.

10

F.H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser’s “More about Fallacies as Derailments of Strategic Maneuvering: The Case of Tu Quoque”

References
Barth, E.M., & Krabbe, E.C.W. (1982). From Axiom to Dialogue: A Philosophical Study of
Logics and Argumentation. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Barth, E.M., & Martens, J.L. (1977). Argumentum ad hominem: From chaos to formal
dialectic. The method of dialogue tableaus as a tool in the theory of fallacy. Logique et
analyse n.s. 20, 76–96.
Eemeren, F.H. van (2001). Fallacies. In F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Crucial Concepts in
Argumentation Theory (pp. 135-164). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions: A
Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed towards Solving Conflicts of
Opinion. Berlin/Dordrecht: De Gruyter/Foris.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1987). Fallacies in pragma-dialectical perspective.
Argumentation 1, 283-301.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992a). Argumentation, Communication, and
Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992b). Relevance reviewed: The case of
argumentum ad hominem. Argumentation 6, 141-159.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2003). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. The
Pragma-Dialectical Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2002a). Strategic maneuvering with the burden of
proof. In F.H. van Eemeren, Advances in Pragma-Dialectics (pp. 13-28).
Amsterdam/Newport News, VA: Sic Sat/Vale Press.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2002b). Strategic maneuvering: Maintaining a delicate
balance. In F.H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and Rhetoric: The Warp and
Woof of Argumentation Analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Finocchiaro, M. (1981). Fallacies and the evaluation of reasoning. American Philosophical
Quarterly 18, 13-22.
Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action. (Transl. of Theorie der
kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981.) London: Heinemann.
Hamblin, C.L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen.
http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/1999/index.htm. General Assembly of the United Nations.
Fifty-fourth session, item 53 of the provisional agenda: Report of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.

11

F.H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser’s “More about Fallacies as Derailments of Strategic Maneuvering: The Case of Tu Quoque”

Jackson, S. (1995). Fallacies and heuristics. In F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair &
C.A. Willard (Eds.), Analysis and Evaluation. Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on
Argumentation. Vol. II (pp. 257-269). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Jacobs, S. (2002). Messages, functional contexts, and categories of fallacy: Some dialectical
and rhetorical considerations. In F.H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and
Rhetoric: The Warp and Woof of Argumentation Analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Johnson, R.H. (2000). Manifest Rationality. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Lausberg, Heinrich (1998). Handbook of Literary Rhetoric. A Foundation for Literary Study.
Ed. by David E. Orton & R. Dean Anderson. Leiden, etc.: Brill. (Transl. of Handbuch der
literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft. 2nd ed. 1973. Ismaning
bei München: Max Hueber Verlag.)
Schreier, M., Groeben, N, & Christmann, U. (1995). “That’s not fair!” Argumentational
integrity as an ethics of argumentative communication. Argumentation 9, 267-289.
Walton, D.N. (1987). Informal Fallacies. Towards a Theory of Argument Criticisms.
Pragmatics & Beyond Companion Series 4. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Walton, D.N. (1992). Types of dialogue, dialectical shifts and fallacies. In F.H. van Eemeren,
R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair & C.A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation Illuminated (pp. 133-147).
Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Walton, D.N. (1995). A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy. Tuscaloosa: The University of
Alabama Press.
Walton, D.N. (1998). Ad Hominem Arguments. Tuscaloosa/London: The University of
Alabama Press.
Walton, D.N. (1999). The appeal to ignorance, or argumentum ad ignorantiam.
Argumentation 13, 367-377.
Woods, J. (1992). Who cares about the fallacies? In F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A.
Blair & C.A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation Illuminated (pp. 23-48). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Woods, J., & Walton, D.N. (1989). Fallacies. Selected Papers 1972-1982. Berlin/Dordrecht:
De Gruyter/Foris.

12

